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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the role of sales as a feature of price dynamics using scanner data. The 
study analyses an extensive, high frequency panel of supermarket prices consisting of over 
230,000 weekly price observations on around 500 products in 15 categories of food stocked by 
the UK’s seven largest retail chains. In all, 1,700 weekly time series are available at the 
barcode-specific level including branded and own-label products. The data allows the 
frequency, magnitude and duration of sales to be analysed in greater detail than has hitherto 
been possible with UK data. The main results are: (i) sales are a key feature of aggregate 
price variation with around 40 per cent of price variation being accounted for by sales 
once price differences for each Unique Product Code (UPC) level across the major 
retailers are accounted for; (ii) there is considerable heterogeneity in the use of sales 
across retailers; (iii) much of the price variation that is observed in the UK food 
retailing sector is accounted for by price differences between retailers; (iv) only a small 
proportion of price variation that is observed in UK food retailing is common across 
the major retailers suggesting that cost shocks originating at the manufacturing level is 
not one of the main sources of price variation in the UK; (v) own-label products also 
exhibit considerable sales behaviour though this is less important than sales for 
branded goods; and (vi) there is some evidence of coordination in the timing of sales 
across retailers insofar as the probability of a sale at the UPC level at a given retailer 
increases if the product is also on sale at another retailer.  
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Sales and Retail Price Dynamics: Evidence from UK Food Retailing. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we explore the role of sales in explaining the dynamics of retail food 
prices using scanner data for all major retailers in the UK food sector. In general, the 
role of sales matters from two broad perspectives: first, set against a background that is 
often characterised by ‘sticky’ prices, sales play a potentially important role both in 
respect of temporary price variation and retail price inflation more generally (Kehoe 
and Midrigan, 2008); second, from an industrial organisation perspective, the issue 
arises with respect to understanding price setting and the extent to which firms 
compete via temporary reductions in price. As a consequence, the role of sales in 
explaining retail price movements has received some attention in the recent 
macroeconomic and industrial organisation literature, often with specific reference to 
retail food prices. Most notably, using US data, Hosken and Rieffen (2004) emphasize 
the importance of sales in overall price adjustment and provide evidence that sales are 
a significant feature of retail price dynamics. Specifically, depending on the product 
category, they report that 20 to 50 per cent of the annual variation in retail (food) prices 
is due to sales. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report that 20 per cent of price changes 
are due to sales which are typically concentrated in relatively few sectors such as food 
and clothing. Berck et al. (2008) use weekly data on orange juice in the US. They note 
that the existing industrial organisation literature on sales implicitly assumes that sales 
are determined by manufacturers not retailers while their results suggest that 
understanding the role of retailers is key in understanding sales behaviour
1, 2
. The issue 
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 This issue has also been highlighted by Hosken and Rieffen (2004). 
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of whether sales originate at the retail level rather than being determined by 
manufacturers is also addressed by Nakamura and Steinsson (op. cit.) and Hosken and 
Rieffen (op. cit.)
3
.  
 
In this paper, we contribute to the empirical literature on sales and the role of sales in 
price variation using high-frequency (weekly) data on UK food retailing with scanner 
data covering all the major food retailers in the UK. Our coverage provides the most 
comprehensive overview of the role of sales in retail food price dynamics to date by 
identifying the extent and importance of sales for over 500 food products using high 
frequency (weekly) data for all major retail chains in a well-defined market, the data 
also allowing us to separate our the existence of sales for own-label and branded 
products. Specifically, we use scanner data at the Unique Product Code (UPC) level, 
covering 500 products in 15 categories of food sold in the UK’s seven largest food 
retail chains over a two and a half year period from September 2001 to April 2004. The 
data we employ are at weekly intervals rather than monthly (see, in comparison, 
Hosken and Rieffen (op. cit.) and Nakamura and Steinsson (op. cit.) who use monthly), 
which is an advantage if promotions exist for only one or two weeks at a time  (Hosken 
and Rieffen, op. cit.)
4
. In addition, the UPC data is available at the individual retailer-
level and our coverage relates to all the major food retailers in the UK, giving 1,704 
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 Most notable contributions that address the issue of sales include Varian (1980), Sobel (1984), 
Pesendorfer (2002) among others. These papers relate sales either to firms discriminating among 
different types of consumers or over time. Another strand emphasises the role of store inventories. For 
an example of the latter, see Aguirregabiria (1999).  
3
 The observation that sales are more likely to be driven by retailers rather than manufacturers is also 
noted by Nakamura (2008), the role of retailers in price behaviour more generally being highlighted by 
Villas-Boas (2007) and Chevalier et al. (2003) among others. 
4
 Data frequency and how the data are reported is an issue in identifying sales. In Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2008), the data is monthly and comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) used to 
construct the consumer price index where a ‘sale’ is denoted by a sale flag when the data is collected. 
Nakamura (2008) uses weekly scanner data at the UPC level by retailer and store for one year. Berck et 
al. (2008) use weekly scanner data for two product categories (fresh and concentrated orange juice) 
across stores and retailers across the US. In the latter, they have to define what will be categorised as a 
“sale” in the data, which is the approach that is also followed here. Determining a sale in this manner is 
also the approach followed by Hosken and Rieffen (2004). 
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UPCs in all. The UK’s food retailing sector is highly concentrated and with the retail 
chains reportedly employing national pricing strategies, the data coverage here offers 
important insights into the significance of sales across different retail chains.
5
. Finally, 
the UPC data we use separates out own-label products from branded products for each 
of the major retailers, so we are able to offer an assessment based on brand status, 
something that was not possible in the studies by Hosken and Rieffen (op. cit.) and 
Nakamura (op. cit.). This distinction has been highlighted by Berck et al. (op. cit.) but 
the data coverage in their paper related to orange juice products only.  As such, we 
offer a more general perspective on the brand/own-label distinction relating to the 
contribution of sales in retail price dynamics. 
 
Our key results are as follows: (i) sales are a key feature of aggregate price variation 
with around 40 per cent of price variation being accounted for by sales once price 
differences for each UPC level across the major retailers are accounted for; (ii) much 
of the price variation that is observed in the UK food retailing sector is actually 
accounted for by persistent price differences between retailers; (iii) there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the use of sales across retailers; (iv) only a small 
proportion of price variation that is observed in UK food retailing is common across 
the major retailers, suggesting that cost shocks originating at the manufacturing level is 
not one of the main sources of price variation in the UK (this observation being 
consistent with Nakamura (op. cit) and Hosken and Rieffen (op. cit.) for the US but 
with the evidence reported here being suggesting that the role of ‘common’ shocks to 
be less important than in the US); (v) own-label products also exhibit considerable 
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 Concerns about the potential for market power exerted by UK food retailers have attracted the attention 
of the UK Competition Commission. See Competition Commission (2000) for a comprehensive 
overview of this sector and assessment relating to concerns about market power. In 2005, the four 
leading retailers had a combined share of around 75 per cent of the retail grocery market (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2006). 
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sales behaviour though this is less important than sales for branded goods; and (vi) 
there is some evidence of coordination in the timing of sales across retailers insofar as 
the probability of a sale at the UPC level at a given retailer increases if the product is 
also on sale at another retailer. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data that forms the 
basis for the analysis of sales. In Section 3, we present a discussion of the 
methodological issues in identifying sales periods and, in Section 4, we provide a 
summary of the principal features of sales in the UK food retailing sector. In Section 5, 
we provide an overall assessment of the relative importance of sales in price variation 
and gauge the role of sales against ‘common’ price changes originating from the 
manufacturing sector and retailer-specific price variation. We address the timing of 
sales across retailers in Section 6 and, in Section 7, we summarise and conclude.  
 
2. Price Data 
In the empirical analysis, we utilise an extensive and high-frequency panel of 
supermarket food prices derived from electronic point of sale (EPOS) data obtained 
from Nielsen Scantrack, a leading market research company which collects data 
relating to in-store transactions. Our data derives from the records of the seven largest 
of these supermarkets which, as a group, represented around three-quarters of all food 
sales in the UK during the sample period. 
6
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 The seven supermarkets included in the sample are Tesco, Sainsbury, ASDA, Safeway, Somerfield, 
Kwik Save and Waitrose. The remaining 25% of sales are accounted for by small national and regional 
supermarket chains and independent retailers.  Discounters such as Lidl, Netto and Aldi did not submit 
data to Neilsen at the time of the sample, but together accounted for less than 3% of market share. Marks 
and Spencer did not sell branded goods and are excluded for this reason. 
5 
The price information contained in the data set is based on the details recorded by laser 
bar-code scanners as products pass through supermarket check-outs. As a result, prices 
are based on 100% of transactions of the sampled products rather than derived from 
consumer surveys. Overall, the data covers 231,069 weekly price observations on 507 
products in 15 categories of food.
7
 They relate to a (137 observation) sample frame 
running from 8
th
 September 2001 to 17
th
 April 2004. Some 90% of products are 
available throughout this period, the minimum number of observations for any product 
being 103 weeks. 
8
 
 
Each price observation in the sample represents the simple average of the prices posted 
in each of the retailers’ stores on the Saturday of each week. Price observations are 
thus retailer-based national (Great Britain) averages. For a retailer such as Tesco, the 
largest in the UK, prices are averaged over those posted in several hundred of its stores 
nationwide. While store managers may have some flexibility over pricing, particularly 
for perishable items, the large number of products stocked in most stores (which 
typically exceeds 25,000) mitigates against widespread differences between stores. 
Also, major UK grocery retail chains claim that national pricing strategies are the norm 
for the bar-coded food products (Competition Commission, 2000).  
 
One key feature of the prices is that they incorporate the effect of promotional activity. 
The price data used in this study include all promotional activity, whether in the form 
of price (e.g. ‘50% off’) or quantity (‘buy-one-get-one-free’) discounts. Discounts 
                                                 
7
 The 15 categories are orange juice, instant coffee, breakfast cereals, teabags, yoghurt, wrapped bread, 
tinned tuna, tinned tomatoes, tinned soup, corned beef, fish fingers, frozen peas, frozen chips, Jam and 
frozen pizza.  
8
  Time series are contiguous (in that there are no missing observations once the time series has begun) 
in 100% of cases, although some (10%) start later than 8
th
 September. All time series finish in the week 
ending 17
th
 April 2004.   
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relating to store ‘loyalty’ cards are not included since they apply to the consumer’s 
total spend rather than the prices of specific products.  
 
The data set identifies products at a highly detailed level. In general, two products are 
distinct if they have different bar-codes, so that 100 gram and 200 gram jars of the 
same brand of instant coffee are different products for which separate prices are 
recorded. Furthermore, many of the products are national brands that are sold by all 
retail chains, so the data set contains retailer-specific prices of such products.  We 
identify each retailer-product combination with a Unique Product Code (UPC), so that, 
for example, a 100 gram jar of Nescafe ‘Gold Blend’ instant coffee stocked by Tesco 
and Sainsbury are two separate UPCs each with their own time series of weekly prices. 
In all there are 1,704 such UPC price series, the distribution of which is summarised in 
Table 1.
 9
  Data (percentage of data set) are most prevalent in the bread (34%), soup 
(18%), coffee (8%) and orange juice (6%) categories, each of which contain in excess 
100 UPCs. The least populated categories, such as frozen fish fingers (1%) and frozen 
pizza (1%), contain 20 UPCs each. As is evident from these figures, the data set does 
not fully reflect consumer spending on food (fresh fruit and vegetables are not part of 
the dataset since they do not carry unique bar-code indicators) but the range of 
categories is nevertheless broad, spanning beverages and foods across a range of 
formats (fresh, chilled ambient and frozen).   
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 Each price observation is uniquely identified by its UPC and the (week ending) date but because the 
data set is an unbalanced panel (in that not all products are sold in all supermarket chains in all weeks) 
summary statistics vary slightly depending on the standardisation that is used.  For example, orange 
juice accounts for 5.33% of the product codes, 6.34% of the UPCs (product code × retailers stocking the 
product) and 6.40% of the observations (product code × retailers × weeks).  Unless specifically stated, 
UPC (i.e. the product code-retailer combination) will be taken to represent the principal unit of analysis 
when describing the dataset.  
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As Table 1 also shows, seven categories contain products in both branded (sold with 
the manufacturer’s name) and own-label (sold under the retailer’s name) forms. Own-
label products with the same product profile (e.g. an 800 gram standard medium sliced 
white loaf) are treated as one product and have the same product code in the data base.  
Retailer-specific prices of these products (i.e. UPCs) represent the Tesco own-label 
800 gram standard medium sliced white loaf or the Sainsbury own label 800 gram 
standard medium sliced white loaf, for example.  Hence, own-label versions of the 
same product are treated analogously to the branded products stocked by multiple 
retailers in the Nielsen Scantrack data set. In the UK, where sales of own-label 
products account for a significant minority of the total consumer spend, this dimension 
of the data set offers potential insights in to any differences between the pricing of 
manufacturer- and retailer- branded products. Own-label products account for nearly 
one-fifth of the products listed in the data set. 
 
Table 1 Here 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the data set is that prices are available by retail 
chain, facilitating comparison of price and sales behaviour for identically bar-coded 
products across retailers.  The 1,704 UPCs belong to 507 bar-coded products and Table 
2 details at a dis-aggregate level how these products are distributed across retailers, 
broken down by label.
 10
 As is clear, not every product is stocked by all retailers but 
two-thirds (64%=325/507) are sold in at least 2 retailers, and 18% sold in all seven. In 
terms of the distribution of products by label, some 71% (=267/375) of branded 
products are sold in at least 2 retailers with 21% sold in all seven. For own-label 
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  Note that the entries in Table 2 refer to products (e.g. 100g jar of Nescafe ‘Gold Blend’ instant 
coffee) rather than UPCs (100g jar of Nescafe ‘Gold Blend’ instant coffee in Tesco) and thus 
proportions in the table need not correspond to those in Table 1. See previous footnote for clarification.   
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products, comparable statistics are 43% and 11% suggesting that coverage is 
reasonably broad across the market as a whole, particularly for branded goods.  
 
Table 2 Here 
 
Finally, Table 3 shows how the UPCs are distributed by retailer. The figures suggest 
that all seven supermarkets are well-represented in the sample, Tesco having the 
largest number of observations at 17% and Waitrose the fewest at 11%.  
 
Table 3 Here 
 
To give a flavour of the data, Figure 1 presents the prices of eight well-known branded 
products selected from the data set on the basis that they are sold in most if not all of 
the retail chains.  Hence, for each product, there are seven UPCs representing the 
national average prices in each of the retailers at weekly intervals. Although 
accounting for a small fraction of the prices in the data set, they display a number of 
interesting features, in particular is the way that sales punctuate the time series, albeit 
with a frequency and intensity that varies by product and retailer.  When not on sale, 
prices tend to coalesce around particular levels, although this ‘regular’ (i.e. non-sale) 
price changes at discrete points in the sample. It is also apparent that, despite 
representing the prices of identically bar-coded products, there are persistent and 
substantial differences in the prices charged by retail chains.  
 
Figure 1 Here 
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Using the entire data set, the average difference between the highest and lowest weekly 
prices paid for products with the same barcode is 30%. For branded products this 
dispersion is 27% and, for own-label products, 45%. While these figures underline the 
fact that price dispersion is pervasive and significant, it seems likely that such 
dispersion arises from not only from persistent price differentials across retailers but 
also the compounding effect of sales. 
 
Before we attempt to disentangle the contribution of these effects to overall price 
variation, it is useful to investigate the dispersion of average prices charged by each 
retailer over the sample. To do so, consider Table 4 which details the average prices of 
products in each retailer for branded, own-label and all products (i.e. branded and own-
label combined). As alluded to above, not every product is stocked by all retailers so 
the table reports prices based on two classifications of products: (a) those products 
stocked in each retailer and (b) the subset of 92 products (comprising 78 branded 14 
own-label) and that are stocked by all seven retailers. Being common to all the 
retailers, these products typically represent market leaders, major national brands and 
everyday own-label products such as standard white loaf and tinned tomatoes. The 
table also lists the rank order of average prices by supermarket (1 denoting the 
cheapest) and the number of price observations upon which the averages are based.  
 
With differences according to the product grouping and label status, the picture is a 
complex one, but a few features are particularly noteworthy. In terms of the 
classification given by (a) namely, the products that each supermarket stocks, there 
appears to be a cluster of supermarkets (Asda, Somerfield and Kwik Save) selling 
10 
branded products at low cost and another cluster of mainstream retailers (comprising 
Asda, Tesco and Sainsbury) selling own-label products at low cost.  
 
While offering a useful summary of pricing across retailers, it is price comparisons 
based on a common basket of products that should generate a more accurate 
comparison. Using the prices of the 92 products stocked in all seven retailers, we find 
that a single cluster of supermarkets (Asda, Tesco, Sainsbury and Kwik Save) offers 
low prices in both branded and own-label product categories.  One retailer (Asda) 
appears in all such clusters and leads the rankings whichever way the data are 
classified. While it offers the same average price for the set of branded products as the 
UK’s largest retailer, Tesco, it is prices of like-for-like own-label products are 
markedly lower than its rivals. 
 
Overall, the following stylised facts emerge from this simple analysis of average 
prices, namely: (i) the average prices for national brands and brand leaders are 
remarkably similar, particularly among the four retailers with the lowest average 
prices; (ii) there is a significant premium for branded products; (iii) when comparing 
the like-for-like products in our sample, it is the mainstream retailers that offer the 
lowest prices for both branded and own-label products. Clearly, when assessing the 
role of sales in retail price variation, we need to control for the underlying intra-retailer 
price differences at the UPC level. 
 
Table 4 Here 
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3.  Creating Sales Data 
In order to investigate the impact of sales, an indicator variable is created to identify 
sale periods. Prices are generally not declared as ‘sale’ or ‘regular’ by manufacturers or 
retailers in the data sets constructed by government departments or commercial 
organisations, with the result that the identification of sale periods is based upon the 
prices themselves. Broadly speaking, sales are simply periods of temporary price 
reduction, although the precise definition employed in empirical work varies. For 
example, prices supplied by the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) for the construction 
of the U.S. Consumer Price Index  is identified as ‘on sale’ if the product is sold below 
its ‘regular selling price’, as assessed by the Bureau’s field agents in the monthly 
survey.  Nakamura and Steinsson (op. cit.) use this sales flag to identify sale periods.  
Hosken and Reiffen (op. cit.) also use BLS data but define a sale with reference to the 
actual behaviour of prices, rather than the field agents’ assessment. Specifically, if a 
price falls by more than some fixed percentage (they consider 10% and 20%) between 
two adjacent months (m-1 and m) but is then reversed in the following month (i.e. 
between m and m+1), the product is treated as being on sale in month m. In other 
words, a product is recorded as being ‘on sale’ in month m if the prices in months m-1 
and m+1 are markedly (i.e. 10% or 20%) higher. Unlike the Nakamura and Steinsson 
(op. cit.) measure, this definition implicitly restricts sales to last one month, although 
this is probably not an unreasonable assumption in the majority of cases. Nevertheless, 
because price setting typically occurs on a weekly basis, some of the finer detail of 
price adjustment is inevitably obscured by the use of monthly data.  
 
In recent studies analysing weekly price data, definitions of sale prices are modified to 
reflect the data set’s higher frequency.  For example, Campbell and Eden (2005) define 
12 
a sale to have occurred if a price decline of 10% or more between weeks w-1 and w is 
then completely reversed within two weeks (i.e. in w +1 or w+2). Using this definition, 
a sale lasts for a minimum of one and a maximum of three weeks.  Berck et al. (op.cit.) 
consider price falls of 25%, 35% and 50%, but use the store’s modal price ( p~ ) over a 
two year period as the basis for comparison rather than the price in the week preceding 
the decline. Using this definition, sales are recorded for all weeks w in which the price 
falls a certain percentage below p~ . While this approach leaves the length of sales 
unconstrained, it relies upon the mode being representative of the non-sale (or 
‘regular’) price. Where regular prices changes over time (reflecting general inflation or 
specific changes in production costs, for example), the use of the mode to identify sales 
is arguably less than ideal (see below).
11
 
 
The foregoing discussion serves to highlight some of the practical difficulties  in 
identifying sales (‘periods of temporary low prices’) from price data alone, namely the 
duration of ‘temporary’, the magnitude of ‘low’ and the reference price used in the 
assessment of each. Mindful of these considerations, we define a sale as a period 
during which price falls by at least x% of the observation immediately preceding the 
decline in prices, and then which is reversed within 12 weeks. With this definition, 
there are several points to note. First, sales of long duration (i.e. less than 3 months) are 
allowed for.  While sales of 2-4 weeks are typically believed to be the norm and sales 
of longer than 6 weeks rare in UK food retailing (Competition Commission, 2000 
p.116), this measure does allow for the (albeit infrequently observed) longer sale 
durations. Second, it is the cumulative price drop (i.e. the peak-to-trough difference) 
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  It is noteworthy that in their study of refrigerated and frozen orange juice, Berck et al. (2008) find 
evidence of a clear mode in fewer than half the refrigerated products and in two-thirds of frozen 
products they analyse. 
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that is used rather than any week-on-week change in price that is used to define the 
magnitude of price change. This allows for price changes that are staggered over more 
than a single week at the start or end of a sale period. This may be important in our 
data if a national price promotion is implemented over adjacent weeks. Third, it is 
actual prices that act as the reference price. This is likely to be useful in cases where 
there is no single non-sale price that applies over the entire sample. Hence, the regular 
price, refers to a state of nature (paralleling the status of the term sale price) rather than 
a fixed value such as the mode. Fourth, in recognition of the fact that results inevitably 
depend on the price decline that is chosen, we consider three thresholds, namely x = 
10%, 25%, and 35%. Fifth, the sale period ends when prices return to a new regular 
price. With this condition, prices do not need to return to their pre-sale level. Finally, 
all prices between the initial decline and the subsequent reversal are counted as sale 
prices.  
 
In order to illustrate the effect of these conditions in the creation of a sale indicator, 
consider the stylised weekly time series of prices depicted in Figure 2. While the figure 
is by no means representative of the price series in the data set, it exhibits some of the 
more problematic features that characterise some series, most notably changes in the 
regular price and staggered sale prices. At the top of the figure are labels (R and S 
denoting regular and sales prices respectively) generated by application of our sales 
algorithm with a 10% threshold to the stylised data. Numbers adjacent to the price 
levels denote the (non-zero) week-on-week percentage price changes.  
 
In the figure, there are three episodes of lower prices, commencing at weeks t , t  and 
t , although only one (at time t  and shaded grey)) is recorded as a ‘sale’ by our 
14 
definition. This owes to the fact this is the only one of the three periods which satisfies 
the conditions that (a) the peak-to-trough price drop exceeds 10% and (b) the price 
returns to a level similar to the pre-sale level within 12 weeks. Note that neither of the 
(9%) falls that make up the 18% cumulative decline would trigger a sale using a 10% 
week-on-week criterion. The two other periods of price decline shown (at t  and t ) 
do not qualify as sales by our definition because in the first case the price decline (of 
2%) is too small; and in the second case, the decline is not reversed. The ability to 
discriminate between sale episodes and periods in which the regular price falls is useful 
since both aspects of behaviour are apparent in some of the price series over the sample 
period. The hypothetical data also illustrate the limitations of using the sample mode 
(denoted by p~  in Figure 2) as a measure of the regular price or indeed monthly (rather 
than weekly) prices, to detect sales. Whereas changes (or trends) in the regular price 
undermine the former, aggregation confounds the latter; neither identifies the sale in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 Here 
 
While the flexibility of the sales definition we have adopted in this paper seeks to 
overcome some of the key issues in data of this sort, it should not be overlooked that 
any set of criteria designed to distinguish sales from changes in the regular price using 
prices alone are to some extent arbitrary. As a guiding principle, it seems reasonable 
that the larger the transitory price decline is, the more likely it is that the observations 
represent a sale. For this reason, we initially consider (peak-to-trough) price drops of 
10%, 25% and 35% in sales identification, a description of which is presented in the 
following section. 
15 
 
4. Sales Data  
Table 5 reports summary statistics of the sales defined according to 10, 25 and 35 per 
cent thresholds. It shows that nearly 8% of prices are classed as ‘on sale’ using the 10% 
threshold, a figure that drops to 3.5% and 1.4% using the larger discounts.  Thus while 
sales are clearly the exception to the normal rule of pricing, only very deep sales are 
rare. Table 5 also reports the proportion of time series that contain at least one sale 
episode and here the incidence of sales is more evenly distributed. Specifically, two-
thirds of all time series have been on a 10% sale, one-fifth experiencing a deep (35%) 
sale. Taken together, the statistics suggest that sales are unusual but commonly applied 
across products. Interestingly though, around one-third of the series are never 
discounted (using the 10% measure) during the three years they are observed.. The 
figures in Table 5 also suggest that sales tend to be around four weeks long irrespective 
of their depth, a degree of consistency that suggests that the sales definition is indeed 
able to discriminate between sales and changes in the regular price.
12
   
 
Table 5 Here 
 
In terms of the number of sale episodes (rather than the number of observations), the 
dataset contains 4,309 10% sales, of which around half (2,024) are sales of  greater 
than 25% and one-fifth being sales of greater than 35%. These figures imply that on 
average a UPC will experience a 10% sale around 2.5 times during the sample (a little 
under once per year), a figure that rises to four (just over 1.5 per year) if we consider 
only those UPC that have ever been discounted. These averages mask notable 
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 Had the duration of 10% sales differed substantially from that using other sales depths, it may have 
suggested that a significant proportion of 10% sales were merely changes in the regular price.  
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differences between branded and own-label products. While the duration of sales is 
similar, branded products tend to be discounted both more frequently and more deeply 
than own-label products.  As is clear from the distribution of sale episodes per UPC 
displayed in Figure 2, most products that have been on sale, have only ever been 
discounted once during the sample frame, although there are a small number of 
frequently discounted products.  
 
For a more complete picture the distribution of sales depth, consider Figure 3. While 
sales in excess of 80% have occurred in a handful of cases, discounts in excess of 50% 
are rare, accounting for less than 5% of all sales.  The majority of sales represent 
discounts of between 10 and 30%, the median discount being 24%.   
 
 
Figure 3 Here 
 
Figure 4 Here 
 
Finally, to gain an impression of the use of sales by each of the national retailers, 
consider Figure 5 which shows the proportion of each retailer’s prices that are sales 
under the three thresholds.  There are quite marked differences across retailers: Asda 
uses sales rarely (almost one-tenth of the average); Safeway, Somerfield and Kwik 
Save form a group of ‘discounters’ in that the use of sales is above average for the food 
retailing sector as a whole; Tesco, Sainsbury and Waitrose are “average” users of sales 
activity. This classification is consistent across the depth of sales but becomes 
increasingly apparent the deeper the sale.  All use deep sales rarely, this being even less 
17 
common for Tesco, Sainsbury Waitrose and Asda. Reflecting the comparison of 
average prices as detailed in section 2, the data suggests considerable heterogeneity 
among retailers on the use of sales. 
 
Figure 5 Here 
 
The statistical description of sales presented above suggests a number of stylised facts, 
which are summarised as follows: (i) sales are unusual, occurring less than 10% of the 
time; (ii) marketing strategies differ markedly, even among mainstream retailers; (iii) 
most UPCs experience a sale, although around one-third do not; (iv) brands are 
discounted twice as frequently as own-labels; (v) a small number of products are 
discounted frequently; (vi) sales last around four weeks; (vii) sales typically represent 
discount of 25%. 
 
5.  The Importance of Costs and Sales in Price Variation 
In this section, we explore the role of (‘common’) cost changes and sales in the overall 
variation of retail prices. To address these issues, we also have to account for the 
differences in average prices at the UPC level across retailers as detailed in Section 2. 
Clearly, if cost changes account for a significant proportion of retail price variation 
once the intra-retailer differences are accounted for, this would be consistent with the 
manufacturing sector (or other upstream stage) being the main source of retail price 
variation. However, if sales account for a large proportion of retail price variation, then 
this could reflect the role of retailers as determining price variation particularly if sales 
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feature significantly for the prices of branded and own-label products and given that 
sales activity appears to be fairly heterogeneous across retailers.
13
 
 
Specifically, we use simple regression models to gauge the relative importance of these 
in price variation. To do so, we estimate price regressions containing increasingly rich 
sets of dummy variables: in Model 1, the baseline specification, we fit a set of UPC-
based dummy variables to the price data (i.e. one dummy for each UPC), around which 
variation can be assessed. In this model, the coefficient attached to each UPC dummy 
represents the average weekly price of a bar-coded product (such as a 200g jar of 
Nescafe standard blend instant coffee) at each retailer stocking the product over the 
sample period. In Model 2, the UPC-based dummies are augmented with a set of 
product-level variables that represent the market (i.e. across all supermarkets) average 
regular price for each product (such as a 200g jar of Nescafe standard blend instant 
coffee) in which all sale prices have been replaced by the last regular price preceding 
each sale.  Purged of promotional prices, this variable offers a means by which we can 
capture underlying movements in the regular prices, of which changes in production 
costs (such as the price of coffee beans) are likely to matter.
14
  In Model 3, a set of 
sales dummies is also included, each dummy representing a unique sale episode. With 
prices in all models being expressed in natural logarithms, the regression standard 
errors represent the standard deviation of UPC prices as a proportion of the mean level 
during the sample, and it is this that we use to evaluate the impact of ‘costs’ and sales 
in UPC level price variation. These results suggest that retail food prices in the UK are 
fairly sticky, that ‘common’ cost changes are not a principal cause of retail price 
                                                 
13
 Of course, the variation of sales activity across retailers could reflect price discrimination by 
manufacturers given the heterogeneity of sales behaviour across retailers. However, the presumption 
would be that retailers (not manufacturers) would be able to determine the (sale) prices of own-label 
products. 
14
 Nakamura (2008) and Hosken and Rieffen (2004) offer similar tests on US data.  
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variation and that, in the context of relatively sticky prices, sales activity account for a 
significant proportion of the retail price variation that is observed. 
 
To facilitate comparison across the models, we use price data from the 967 UPCs that 
are sold in at least two supermarkets and have experienced a sale of at least 10% during 
the sample period. The parameters of Models 1, 2 and 3 are estimated by ordinary least 
squares using 132,280 price observations and the regression standard errors (rse) 
reported in Table 6. Results for the ‘All’ regressions head the table with results by label 
and retailer appended beneath.  The results suggest that the standard deviation of prices 
at the UPC level is around 12%, a figure that changes little we confine the analysis to 
brands or own-label.  Allowing for our cost proxy- the movement in the industry 
average regular prices- (Model 2) reduces the standard deviation by a little over one 
percentage point, a result that holds irrespective of the brand/own-label distinction. 
Accounting for sales (Model 3) has a more marked effect, reducing the variation by 
over four percentage points but here the effect of sales is larger for brands (4.6%) than 
own label products (3.1%).  
 
These results are comparable with those of Hosken and Rieffen (op.cit.) and Nakamura 
(op.cit.). They also conclude that sales account for a high proportion of price variability 
though the extent of price stickiness is lower for the data used here than Nakamura (op. 
cit.) finds for the US. In her study, she reports that only 16 per cent of price variation is 
common across all stores selling an identical product. The reduction in the rse as we 
move from Model 1 to Model 2 suggests that around 9 per cent of price variation is 
common across the UK food retailing sector. 
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Turning to price variation by retailer, Table 6 suggest a group of retailers headed by 
Safeway (at 15%) with relatively high price variation, and a group of retailers lead by 
Asda (at 9%) with the lowest variation. Interestingly, while Asda uses sales 
infrequently (see Figure 5), its’ price variation is only marginally lower than other 
mainstream retailers, suggesting that Asda has a tendency to change regular prices 
more than other similar retailers. The effect of our costs measure is broadly the same 
across retailers with the result that patterns in overall price variation are driven by 
promotional behaviour.  
 
Comparison of the variation between the models in Table 6, delivers estimates of the 
contribution of costs and sales in UPC price variation. Using the ‘All Products’ 
classification, costs account for 11% of the price variation, a figure which changes little 
by label. Of primary interest is the contribution of sales, which turns out to be 37% 
overall, with a marked difference between brands and own-label products (39% and 
26% respectively). The corresponding proportions by retailer are shown in Figure 6, 
where the patterns in the absolute levels of price variation are reflected in the relative 
measures, namely that, while industry costs have broadly relatively small and broadly 
similar effects across retailers, the contribution of sales is around 40% of UPC price 
variation in all with the exception of Asda.  
 
Table 6 Here 
 
Taken together, the picture that emerges from this analysis is one in which sales 
dominate the effect of costs (as proxied by industry average regular prices, at least) in 
price variation and combined they account for nearly two-thirds of price variation at 
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the UPC level. Furthermore, sales are more important for branded products so that by 
these measures, idiosyncratic shocks are relatively more important for own-label 
products than brands, possibly reflecting their less uniform composition within the 
product definition. While the market segments by sales behaviour to some extent, it is 
also remarkable how important sales are for all retailers.
15
  
 
Figure 6 Here 
 
6. Are Sales Across Retailers Related? 
Since we have prices by retailer, we can address whether sales behaviour is related 
across retailers. Recall, first of all, that the use of sales by retailer varies (see Figure 6). 
Taking sales greater than 25% as the benchmark, three retailers are higher employ sales 
than average, Tesco (the market leader) is a below average user of sales, while Asda 
hardly ever employed sales over the sample period. Taken from a general perspective, 
the raw data therefore indicates that sales are unlikely to be a common experience 
across retailers. However, to address the issue more directly, we assess whether the 
probability of a sale in one retailer is influenced by a sale in another retailer using the 
data available at the UPC level. The central idea here is to determine whether a sale in 
a specific UPC introduced by a given retailer is a random event or may be related to the 
presence of a sale in one or more rival retailers.  
 
                                                 
15
 As a final step, we carried out the same analysis by UPC. As Hosken and Riefen (2004) note, the 
relative role of costs and sales can vary across products.  The results do not differ significantly from the 
above: prices are relatively sticky across for UPCs that constitute a product group and the role of costs is 
fairly marginal in each case. Sales account for a higher than average proportion of price variation some 
frozen UPCs (e.g. peas, pizzas) and a lower than average proportion of price variation for bread. Since 
the results do not provide additional insights beyond those made above, we do not report them in the 
text. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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To address this issue, we employ a fixed effects conditional logit model. Specifically, 
let ijts be a binary categorical (dummy) variable with 1 denoting a sale price and zero 
for a non-sale price for product Ii ,,1 , retailer Jj ,,1  at time Tt ,1 . In 
order to evaluate whether sales of like products in rival retailers affects the probability 
that the product will be on sale (i.e. discounted) elsewhere, we create a 1K vector of 
dummy variables, itr , ],,2,1[ itititit rKrr r  that indicates whether product i is on sale 
in a rival retailer k. Because each of the variables in itr  refers to each retailer as a rival, 
they are matched with the retailers in ijts  such that 0itrk  for jk   (as j cannot be a 
rival for itself)
16
. Note also that 0itrk  when the product is either not stocked by 
retailer k or stocked but not on sale.  Observations where itrk  equals unity signal that 
product i is stocked in retailer j and k and on sale in retailer j ( jk  ).  For example, 
when considering sales in supermarket 1, i.e. tis 1 , itr1  is zero since those observations 
refer to itself and thus not a rival.  Hence itr1  equals one when considering a product i 
in at time t that is on sale in supermarket 1 and stocked by retailer Jk ,,2  .  Finally, 
let iktM  be a dummy variable indicating whether product i is on sale in period t in at 
least one other retailer in the market, zero otherwise.  In other words, we have an 
indicator variable: 
 
otherwise  0
  for   0  if  1
1

 

ijt
J
k
itijt
M
kjrkM
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 The focus on a “like” product here refers to the identical UPC that is sold across one or more other 
retailers (e.g. a 200g jar of Nescafe). This raises the issue of closely related products. For example, 
whether the sale of a 200g jar of Nescafe is related to a 350g jar of Nescafe or a 200g jar of Nescafe is 
related to the sale of a 200g jar of another brand of coffee. One difficulty in posing the issue in this way 
is that the bounds of defining the product space become unlimited. Therefore, to keep the issue 
manageable, we stick with the sale at the identical UPC level across retailers.  
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If product i is only stocked by one supermarket, the set of J dummy variables itrk  will 
each be zero and hence ijtM  will be zero. Where this happens (about one-third of the 
products are only sold in one supermarket), product i drops out of the regression 
analysis. To investigate whether sales are affected by presence of a sale elsewhere in 
the market, we estimate: 
       ijtijtiijt Ms    (1) 
where the i  represent the UPC-based heterogeneity (fixed effects) and ijt  are 
disturbances with constant mean and variance.  Assuming that ijt are uncorrelated with 
the timing of sales in supermarkets, i.e. 0]|E[ ijtijt M  then, given that ijts  is a binary 
variable, ]|1[P]|E[ ijtijtijtijt MsMs   implies that   is the predicted partial marginal 
probability of a sale on a product given a sale of the same product in at least one other 
supermarket at time period t.   Clearly, if a sale of a product at one retailer is 
independent of the identical product being on sale at any other retailer, 0 . Where 
0  ( 0 ), this indicates that a sale in a given retailer for a specific UPC is more 
(less) likely given the existence of a sale elsewhere in period t.  
We further amend the test by identifying separately whether the sale of the product is 
related across retailers for own-label products.  In this case, the own-label definition 
relates to the “same” own-label product sold across retailers. For example, we are 
relating the sale of Tesco 1 litre orange juice with Sainsbury’s 1 litre orange juice. A 
priori, we may expect less relatedness in the sale of products across retailers when it 
applies to own-label goods.  
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Table 7 reports the estimated probability that a product will be on sale given that it is 
on sale in at least one other retailer using the marginal effects of the conditional logit 
model. The results, which are reported for both branded and own-label products, reject 
the hypothesis that a sale by a retailer is unrelated to the existence of a sale in the same 
UPC elsewhere for branded products but not in the case of own-labels. Specifically, 
(10%) sales in branded products increase the likelihood of sales in rivals stocking the 
product by some 14.3%, a probability that rises slightly for deeper sales.  Thus, sales 
on branded products are not random events, but are to some extent co-ordinated, 
suggesting a tendency for promotions to be uniformly offered across (at least a subset 
of) retailers. However, the probability is not ‘high’ in the sense that the results do not 
indicate that there is perfect coordination in the use of sales. Own-label products 
present a contrasting picture: namely, for 10% and 25% sales, the results indicate that 
sales are independent across retailers though, for the 35% sale category, sales are not 
independent. Given that sales with the 35% benchmark are considerably less common, 
we can conclude that in most cases, sales of own-label goods by retailers are 
independent. 
17
 
Table 7 Here 
7. Conclusions 
This paper presents an analysis of promotional sales using an extensive, high frequency 
micro-economic database of supermarket prices in the UK. Given that the timing of 
                                                 
17
 We also investigated whether sales behaviour by retailer related to the intensity of sales behaviour 
across other retailers. Specifically, the discussion in the text relates to whether the sale by one retailer 
related to the product being on sale at any one of the other retailer. We further investigated the issue in 
terms of whether the probability of a sale by one retailer depended on how many other retailers the 
product was on sale at. The results indicate that the probability of a sale increases depending on the 
number of retailer which also had the product on sale. For example, for the greater than 25% sale 
benchmark, the probability that the product was on sale at one other retailer was 16.2%; if the product 
was on sale at two or more retailer, the probability increased to 24.7% with estimates statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Results are available on request. 
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sales is not recorded, it must be inferred from the prices themselves and the method 
that we have adopted for the identification of sales is described (and is consistent with 
other recent research on sales). Using a 10% peak-to-trough measure, we find that 92% 
of prices are regular, the remainder represent sales. So, although sales are unusual, the 
majority of products experience a sale, the norm being around one sale per year. While 
there are marked differences in the number of times products are on sale (one-third of 
the 1,700 UPCs considered were never on sale in the sample period), promotional 
activity generally lasts 4 weeks and represents discounts that average 25%.  
 
The paper also offers an assessment of the importance of sales in overall price 
variability. In general, retail prices are relatively sticky with ‘common’ cost changes 
originating from the manufacturing sector accounting for only a small proportion of 
overall price variability. This general result is consistent with results using data from 
the US though the evidence presented here suggests that common cost changes account 
for a smaller proportion of overall price variability than reported in the US studies. 
Against this background of relative price stickiness, sales are relatively important 
accounting for around 40 per cent of overall price variability over the data period. 
However, prices and sales activity vary considerably across the major UK food 
retailers and this dispersion is a particularly notable dimension of the data. Further 
results indicate the retailer sales’ activity is not independent and that own-label 
products are also as likely to be on sale as branded products. Taking together, the 
results suggest two broad conclusions that relate to both the macroeconomic and 
industrial organisation literature: first, sales are an important feature of price dynamics; 
second, the role played by retailers is key to understanding price variation. 
26 
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Figure 1: Weekly Prices (pence) of a Selection of Products sold by UK Retail Chains 
Orange Juice: Del Monte 1 Litre Tetra Single  
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Instant Coffee: Nestle Standard Granules 200g jar 
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Frozen Peas: Birds Eye Frozen Garden Peas 454g 
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Breakfast Cereal: Weetabix Original 24s 
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Teabags: PG Tips Blended Teabags 160s 
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Yoghurt: Muller Light Pot Cheery Single 200g  
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Sliced Bread: Kingsmill Medium Sliced White 800g  
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Jam: Streamline Strawberry 400g Jar 
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Figure 2: Sales Identification in a Stylised Weekly Time Series of Prices 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Frequency of Sales 
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Figure 4: Size Distribution of Sales 
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Figure 5: The Prevalence of Sale Prices by Retailer (%) 
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Figure 6: Importance of Sales and Costs in UPC Price Variation by Retailer 
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Table 1: Distribution of Unique Product Codes (UPCs) by Category 
Category Brands Own Label All % of total 
Orange Juice 57 51 108 6.34 
Instant Coffee 111 27 138 8.10 
Tinned Tuna 51 0 51 2.99 
Tinned Tomatoes 50 0 50 2.93 
Tinned Soup 237 71 308 18.08 
Oven Chips 83 0 83 4.87 
Corned Beef 25 5 30 1.76 
Frozen Peas 34 0 34 2.00 
Fish Fingers 20 0 20 1.17 
Breakfast Cereal 66 0 66 3.87 
Tea Bags 59 8 67 3.93 
Yoghurt 65 4 69 4.05 
Wrapped Bread 488 95 583 34.21 
Jam 33 44 77 4.52 
Frozen Pizza 20 0 20 1.17 
Total 1,399 305 1,704 100.00 
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Table 2: The Distribution of Products (by label) Stocked by the Supermarkets 
 Number of Supermarkets   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Branded 
107 46 36 37 28 43 78 375  
28% 12% 10% 10% 7% 11% 21% 100% 
59% 68% 92% 76% 85% 98% 85% 74%  
Own Label 
75 22 3 12 5 1 14 132  
57% 17% 2% 9% 4% 1% 11% 100% 
41% 32% 8% 24% 15% 2% 15% 26%  
Total 
182 68 39 49 33 44 92 507 
36% 13% 8% 10% 6% 9% 18% 100%  
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: Cell entries in bold represent the number of series in each classification, with this number 
expressed as a percentage of the row (label) and column (sold in) totals respectively in the cell entries 
beneath.  
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Unique Product Codes by Retailer 
Chain UPCs % of total 
Tesco 292 17.14 
Sainsbury 275 16.14 
Asda 228 13.38 
Safeway 263 15.43 
Somerfield 242 14.20 
Kwik Save 221 12.97 
Waitrose 183 10.74 
Total 1,704 100.00 
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Table 4: Average Prices by Retailer 
  Branded Products Own-Label Products All Products 
  
(a) 
stocked by 
retailer 
(b) 
stocked by all 
(a) 
stocked by 
retailer 
(b) 
stocked by all 
(a) 
stocked by 
retailer 
(b) 
stocked by all  
  Price Rank Price Rank Price Rank Price Rank Price Rank Price Rank 
TESCO  142 4 132 1 79 2 109 2 128 4 128 2 
SAINSBURY 143 5 134 2 90 3 118 4 132 5 131 4 
ASDA 128 2 132 1 64 1 102 1 117 1 127 1 
SAFEWAY 149 6 142 7 102 5 125 5 142 7 140 7 
SOMERFIELD 129 3 141 6 109 7 130 7 127 3 140 6 
KWIK SAVE 124 1 134 2 98 4 113 3 121 2 131 3 
WAITROSE 155 7 138 5 103 6 128 6 140 6 137 5 
Average 138   136   92   118   130   133   
 
 
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of the Sales Data 
 Sale Threshold 
10% 25% 35% 
 
All Brands 
Own 
Label 
All Brands 
Own 
Label 
All Brands 
Own 
Label 
Frequency (%) 7.8 8.5 4.6 3.5 3.8 1.9 1.4 1.5 0.9 
Products (%) 63.0 66.9 44.9 36.8 49.6 23.9 20.1 21.4 13.8 
Duration (weeks) 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.7 
Sale episodes 4,309 3,848 461 2024 1,824 200 822 740 82 
Sales per UPC 2.5 2.8 1.5 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Sales per UPC 
(sale products only) 
4.0 4.1 3.4 3.2 3.3 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.0 
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Table 6: Regression Standard Error (standard deviation) of Food Product Prices 
 Model 1 
UPC 
Model 2  
UPC + Costs 
Model 3 
UPC+ 
Costs+Sales 
All Products 0.1185 0.1052 0.0609 
Label 
Brand 0.1182 0.1052 0.0592 
Own Label 0.1207 0.1050 0.0737 
Retailer 
Tesco  0.0949 0.0832 0.0382 
Sainsbury 0.1122 0.0894 0.0452 
Asda 0.0912 0.0749 0.0569 
Safeway 0.1461 0.1227 0.0713 
Somerfield 0.1232 0.1100 0.0509 
Kwik Save 0.1298 0.1138 0.0589 
Waitrose 0.0943 0.0819 0.0388 
 
 
 
Table 7: Marginal Effect of a Sale in at Least One Other Retailer on the Probability 
of a Sale Elsewhere 
                                                   Extent of Sale 
 10% Sale 25% Sale 35% Sale 
Branded 0.143* 
(.0084) 
0.178* 
(0.0118) 
0.172* 
(0.0274) 
Own-label Dummy -0.0148 
(.0401) 
0.0138 
(0.0630) 
0.342* 
(0.0572) 
Note: Stars denote significance at the five per cent level. Models estimated using robust standard errors. 
 
